We investigate alternative suspicion functions for Tardos traitor tracing schemes. In the simple decoder approach (computation of a score for every user independently) we derive suspicion functions that optimize a performance indicator related to the sufficient code length in the limit of large coalition size c. Our results hold for the RestrictedDigit Model as well as the Combined-Digit Model. The scores depend on information that is usually not available to the tracer -the attack strategy or the tallies of the symbols received by the colluders. We discuss how such results can be used in realistic contexts.
1. INTRODUCTION
Collusion attacks on watermarking
Forensic watermarking is a means for tracing the origin and distribution of digital content. Before distribution, the content is modified by embedding an imperceptible watermark, which plays the role of a personalized serial number. Once an unauthorized copy of the content is found, the identities of those users who participated in its creation can be determined. A tracing algorithm outputs a list of suspicious users.
The most powerful attacks against watermarking are collusion attacks, in which multiple attackers (the 'coalition') combine their differently watermarked versions of the same content; the observed differences point to the locations of the hidden marks.
In the past two decades several types of collusion-resistant codes have been developed. The most popular type in the recent literature is the class of bias-based codes. These were introduced by G. Tardos in 2003. The original paper [22] was followed by a flurry of activity, e.g. improved analyses [2, 6, 7, 10, 17, 21] , code modifications [8, 14, 15] , decoder modifications [1, 5, 12] and various generalizations [4, 18, 19, 23] . The advantage of bias-based versus deterministic codes is that they can achieve the asymptotically optimal relationship ∝ c 2 between the sufficient code length and the coalition size c.
Two kinds of tracing algorithm can be distinguished: (i) simple decoders, which assign a level of suspicion to single users and (ii) joint decoders [1, 5, 12] , which look at sets of users. Joint decoders employ a simple decoder as a bootstrapping step.
Tardos' scheme worked with a binary code and a simple decoder. Its 'suspicion function' for computing a level of suspicion for single users was improved [18] and the scheme was generalized to q-ary alphabets. However, it turns out [20] that the suspicion function yields sub-optimal fingerprinting rates for q > 3, i.e. rather far below the fingerprinting capacity [3, 9] and far below the dynamic code rate [11] .
Alternative suspicion functions for the binary case were introduced [5] , where an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm was used. A candidate coalition is selected, which (if the guess is sufficiently good) makes it possible to estimate the employed attack strategy; a suspicion function is then used which is optimized against that strategy. This leads to a new ranking of users, giving a new candidate coalition, and the whole process is repeated until it converges.
Contributions
In this paper we further study suspicion functions.
• We generalize the work of Charpentier et al. [5] to qary alphabets. Using functional derivation methods we obtain suspicion functions that asymptotically (c 1) maximize the expected score for the coalition, allowing the tracer to distinguish best between them and the innocent users. We present results for the CombinedDigit Model and the Restricted-Digit Model.
• We consider a set of often-considered attack strategies.
We substitute these attacks into the generic formulas and obtain closed-form expressions for the optimal suspicion functions associated with these attacks.
• We tabulate the performance for each combination of attack and suspicion function. For some cases we prove theorems analytically and for all cases we have numerical results. Naturally, in case of a match the sufficient code length is small; for all considered strategies but the interleaving attack we even find ∝ c 3/2 . For the interleaving attack and its matching suspicion function we find an asymptotic fingerprinting rate (q −1)/(2c 2 ln q), which is exactly the q-ary asymptotic fingerprinting capacity.
In non-matching cases the results differ widely. In some cases, as expected, the mismatched defense fails completely, while in others the code length remains ∝ c 2 (often smaller than with the Tardos suspicion function), and in many cases we find ∝ c 3/2 even for a mismatch.
In Sections 3.1 and 7 we comment on possible ways to exploit our results for the construction of improved decoders by using several suspicion functions in parallel, and/or deploying a tally-dependent suspicion to strengthen the EM algorithm, and/or to validate candidate coalitions in general.
This paper contains a large number of lemmas and theorems. Not all the proofs are shown, due to space constraints. All proofs can be found in the ePrint version [16] .
PRELIMINARIES

General notation
We denote random variables by capital letters and their realizations in lower case. We write vectors in boldface. We define [ ] = {1, . . . , }. The q-ary alphabet is A, which is sometimes set to A = {0, . . . , q − 1}. We use multiindex notation, e.g.
We define the norm of a vector as |p| = α∈A |pα|. For probability mass/density functions we use abbreviated notation of the form f y|p = f Y |P (y|p) when it does not cause ambiguity. In conditional expectation values we sometimes use the abbreviation
. An E without subscripts is an expectation over all probabilistic degrees of freedom. We use δx,y to denote the Kronecker delta function, which is 1 when x = y and 0 when x = y.
Bias-based tracing; simple decoder
The content contains abstract 'locations' into which a q-ary symbol can be embedded. For each location i ∈ [ ] independently, the tracer draws a bias vector P i = (Pi,α)α∈A from a distribution f P . The biases satisfy Pi,α ≥ 0 and |P i| = 1. In [18] a symmetric Dirichlet distribution was taken, with concentration parameter κ > 0,
For q = 2 it is customary to set κ = 1 2 , turning (1) into the arcsine distribution for the component p1. However, in that case the support has to be reduced to p1 ∈ [δ, 1 − δ], with cutoff parameter δ > 0, in order to avoid statistical problems due to extremely unlikely events. The probability density function then becomes
As the cutoff parameter is typically chosen so small that it vanishes, we will neglect it in our analysis. The number of users is n. For each i ∈ [ ] and each j ∈ [n], the tracer draws a random symbol Xi,j ∈ A according to the categorical distribution P i, i.e. Pr[Xi,j = α|P i = p i ] = pi,α independent of j. The symbol Xi,j is embedded into the content of user j in location i.
The coalition of attackers is denoted as C ⊂ [n], with |C| = c. In some attack models, e.g. the Combined-Digit Model (Section 2.3), they are allowed to do signal processing attacks such as introducing noise and fusing symbols. In the Restricted-Digit Model (RDM) they are only allowed to select one colluder's symbol (denoted as yi) in location i. In the simple decoder approach, the tracer determines a score Sj for each user j by adding independently computed subscores Si,j for each location i; these are based on p i , Xi,j and the colluders' output in location i. If the score exceeds a threshold, user j is suspect.
Tardos [22] introduced a (simple decoder) score system for he RDM at q = 2 that was later [18] symmetrized and generalized to q > 2. The sub-scores for each location are computed using a 'suspicion function' g as Si,j = g(xi,j, yi, p i ) with
It has the special property that the Si,j of innocent users has expectation 0 and variance 1.
Given the symmetries present in the code generation and accusation algorithm, it is usually assumed that the attackers apply a strategy that acts at every location independently. Furthermore, we assume that the colluders take equal risks. In such an attack model, the colluders' decision in location i depends only on the tallies Mi,α = |{j ∈ C|Xi,j = α}| (with α ∈ A). The tallies satisfy |M i| = c, and they are multinomial-distributed, f m|p = c m p m . The attack strategy may be probabilistic.
Combined-Digit Model (CDM)
The CDM [19] allows colluders to mix symbols and to introduce noise. In each location, the symbols that are mixed are assumed to have equal power. The set of symbols that the colluders choose to mix is denoted as Ψ ⊆ A with mα > 0 for each α ∈ Ψ. The attack strategy is parametrized by a set of probabilities f ψ|m . The tracer has a detector that outputs a set Φ ⊆ A of observed symbols. The joint effects of the noise and the mixing lead to probability distributions f Φ|Ψ , where it is possible that the noise introduces symbols in Φ that are absent in Ψ. Simple-decoder score systems were introduced in [19, 23] . The CDM reduces to the RDM when the noise strength is sent to zero and the detector unerringly observes Φ = Ψ, forcing the colluders to output a single symbol, Ψ = {Y }. For the RDM, a strategy is parametrized by a set of probabilities f y|m .
Performance; moments of the scores
The performance of bias-based tracing schemes can for a large part be characterized by looking merely at the first and second moment of the innocent and guilty scores. (This holds especially at large c, where the large code length induces an almost-Gaussian shape of the score probability distributions.)
For an innocent user j, we define the mean and variance asμ
where the index i ∈ [ ] is arbitrary. The expectation E is taken over the random variables P i, Xi,j, and Yi (in the CDM Ψi and Φi instead of Yi). We call a suspicion function centered if it yieldsμinn = 0 and normalized ifσ 2 inn = 1. For the coalition we define Si,C := j∈C Si,j. The moments arẽ
again with arbitrary index i. If the Gaussian approximation holds, then the sufficient code length is proportional to (μC/σinn) −2 c 2 [21] . We will use the fractionμC/σinn as a performance indicator.
OPTIMAL SUSPICION FUNCTIONS
We consider suspicion functions h other than the function g given in (3). We derive suspicion functions that maximize the performance indicatorμC/σinn, in the CDM as well as the RDM. Without loss of generality, we will consider only suspicion functions that are centered (μinn = 0) and normalized (σinn = 1). We use the standard approach of Lagrange functionals; we use constraint multipliers λ1, λ2 ∈ R to enforce the constraintsμinn = 0 andσinn = 1. We define the functional
whereμinn,σinn andμC depend on the function h as specified in (4) (5) (6) . The optimal h is found by solving the set of equations δL/δh = 0, ∂L/∂λ1 = 0 and ∂L/∂λ2 = 0. The solution depends on the arguments of h: in the CDM the sub-score of user j in location i is typically a function of Xi,j, Φi and P i; in the RDM a function of Xi,j, Yi and P i.
... in the Combined-Digit Model
We present a number of lemmas leading up to the main theorem of this section, which shows the solution obtained by the Lagrangian approach. All proofs can be found in the ePrint version [16] . The conditional probabilities that appear in the lemmas are related as follows: f ψ|p = m f ψ|m f m|p and f φ|p = ψ f φ|ψ f ψ|p . The numbers f φ|ψ are fixed parameters of the CDM independent of the strategy. Lemma 1. An optimal suspicion function of the form h(x, φ, ψ, p) does not depend on φ. An optimal suspicion function of the form h(x, φ, ψ, m, p) depends neither on φ nor ψ.
Proof sketch. The set ψ contains more information about the attackers than the set φ. Likewise, the tallies m contain more information than ψ.
To determine the optimal suspicion functions of the increasingly general forms h(x, φ, p), h(x, φ, ψ, p), and h(x, φ, ψ, m, p), it suffices to study the forms h Φ (x, φ, p), h Ψ (x, ψ, p), and h M (x, m, p), respectively. Lemma 2. Let h be of the form h Φ (x, φ, p) and define
The notation ∂A ∂px | |p|=1 is defined as follows. First the derivative ∂A/∂px is taken without taking the constraint α pα = 1 into account. After differentiation the constraint is enforced.
Lemma 3. Let h be of the form h Ψ (x, ψ, p) and define
Lemma 4. Let h be of the form h M (x, m, p) and define
In each of the cases above, the centered and normalized suspicion function that maximizesμC is
and the expected coalition score isμC = c · Var[T ].
Proposition 5. For the function T in all three cases above it holds that
and thus T is a Neyman-Pearson score.
Several things are worth noting about these results.
(i) In the proof of Theorem 1 it is not necessary to specify the bias distribution. ThoughμC is a functional of both h and f P , the optimization of h does not depend on f P .
(ii) In all three cases the result for h depends on information that the tracer usually does not have. (The strategy f ψ|m in Lemmas 2 and 3; the tallies m in Lemma 4.) When a function h Φ , for some guessed strategy, is used to compute scores, there is no guarantee that the attackers are actually adhering to that guessed strategy. Such 'mismatched' situations will be discussed (for the RDM) in Section 5.
(iii) We can think of two ways in which the m-dependent result of Lemma 4, h(x, y, p) = (
, can be used in practice. First, it could be employed in the EM algorithm [5] . The EM procedure estimates a strategy based on the symbols received by the candidate coalition, and then uses this estimate to adapt the suspicion function. Our h function could be used to directly assign scores to all users, skipping the strategy estimation step. This would speed up each iteration of the EM algorithm and avoid the statistical inaccuracies in the estimation. (Of course, inaccuracies due to a wrongly guessed coalition remain, and may even increase.)
Secondly, this h function can be used as a consistency check in the following way. Suppose that, by some means, a candidate coalitionĈ has been tentatively identified. Then one computes a score (
for all users, where the tally mx is based onĈ and the user's symbol x. IfĈ equals the actual coalition, one should see a huge score difference between innocent users and the colluders. Exploration of these ideas is left for future work.
(iv) The expression ∂ ln f /∂px in all three cases has the form of a Fisher score, being the derivative of the logarithm of a conditional probability with respect to the conditioning variable. We suspect that this form is no coincidence. However, the intuitive meaning of the associated 'game' (guessing p from y) is not immediately obvious. Asymptotically m tends to cp. We hypothesize that the game 'guess p from y' is asymptotically equivalent to 'guess m from y'. The latter is a known formulation of the tracing problem.
(v) Our result in Proposition 5 is different from the NeymanPearson score in [12] , where the whole sequence (Yi) i∈[ ] was considered.
... in the Restricted-Digit Model
The optimal h function in the RDM case follows straightforwardly from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 by taking the limit of zero noise and perfect detection of all mixed symbols, leading to Φ = Ψ = {Y }, with Y ∈ A.
Corollary 6. Let h be of the form hY (x, y, p) and define
In the RDM, Lemma 4 and Theorem 1 hold without change. Note that the Marking Assumption is not invoked to obtain Corollary 6. Hence Corollary 6 is valid in a more general setting, as long as the colluders produce a single symbol which is unerringly detected by the tracer.
Note also that (14) for q = 2 is consistent with Charpentier et al. [5] .
MATCHES
From this point onward, we consider only the RDM. For a number of often-studied strategies we compute the optimal suspicion function. We investigate the situation where the actual attack is indeed the one for which the h-function was designed (a "match"). Mismatches are discussed in Section 5.
Arbitrary alphabets
In case of a match it holds thatμC = √ q − 1 for any f P .
When x = y, the h is positive and increasing in py (rare events raise more suspicion). When x = y, it is negative and constant, in contrast to (3) . The h is independent of c.
All-high attack. The all-high attack
outputs the highest symbol among those received by the coalition. Note that this is the only attack we consider that breaks symbol symmetry and assumes an ordering of the alphabet. This is a special case of the preferred-sequence attack, in which the colluders have a predetermined ranking of the symbols. The results below generalize to the preferred-sequence attack. We will use the shorthand notation a k := (p0 + · · · + p k−1 ) and aB = β∈B p β . In case of a match, it holds that
When x = y, the h is positive. When x > y, it is negative and constant. When x < y, it might be negative or it might not. For instance, for c = 2, we find (ay+1 − ay)/(a . Also, h is the same for all x < y. We now analyze the behaviour ofμC when the symmetric Dirichlet distribution is employed. Before we can state our result, we will need the following Lemma:
Lemma 9. Let P be distributed according to the symmetric Dirichlet distribution without cutoff. The joint distribution for the pair (Ay+1, Ay/Ay+1) is then given by
B(yκ, κ) .
Given this joint distribution, we can now derive our main result for the all-high attack when the symmetric Dirichlet distribution is used.
Proposition 10. Let f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution without cutoff. If the attack is the all-high attack and the defense matches it, then, for large c,
where ζ is the Riemann zeta function.
Random-symbol attack. The random-symbol attack selects one of the received symbols uniformly at random. Tallies are disregarded, but a symbol can only be chosen if its tally is nonzero. The attack is parametrized by f y|m = (1 − δm y ,0)/|{α ∈ A : mα > 0}|. 
The optimal suspicion function is h = (T − 1)/ Var[T ], with
Binary alphabet (q = 2)
All-1 attack. The binary all-high attack is known as the all-1 attack. It has f 1|m = 1 whenever m1 > 0 and f 1|m = 0 when m1 = 0. 
In case of a match it holds that
When x < y, the h is positive for any c, in contrast to the q-ary case.
Corollary 13. Let f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with κ = 
(26)
Minority-vote attack. The minority-vote attack outputs the symbol with the lowest nonzero tally. In case of a tie, a uniform choice is made from the winners. We have analytical expressions for the majority-vote and minority-vote attack, but we do not write them down here because of lack of space.
MISMATCHES
In this section, we analyze what happens when the coalition mounts a different attack than the tracer expected. We call the "optimal suspicion function against strategy A" the A-defense. We show that even when the score function does not match the pirate strategy, the optimal score functions derived in the previous section remain centered but not necessarily normalized. The main results of this section are analytical expressions for the performance indicator in case of a mismatch for the Tardos defense, the interleaving defense, and the interleaving attack.
Recall thatμC = c · E[T · h]. This expression remains valid in the case of a mismatch, where T is for the actual attack and h is the function that is used as defense.
We call a suspicion function h(x, y, p) strongly centered if E X|p [h(X, y, p)] = 0 and strongly normalized if
Lemma 15. Each optimal suspicion function (see Theorem 1) is strongly centered. So is the symmetric Tardos function.
Tardos Suspicion Function
We start by considering the traditional symmetric Tardos suspicion function.
Lemma 16. If the tracer uses the symmetric Tardos suspicion function, theñ
Against the interleaving attack, the symmetric Tardos suspicion function does not perform well for large q: and no cutoff is used,
We see thatμC is a slowly increasing function of q, which is bad for the code rate. 
In the binary case the Tardos defense has a constantμC:
Proposition 20.
[18] Let q = 2 and f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with parameter κ = , no matter what attack the coalition uses.
Interleaving defense
We now turn our attention to the interleaving defense.
Lemma 21. If the tracer uses the interleaving defense, then, no matter what attack is used,
where T belongs to the attack.
We can explicitly calculate the performance against the allhigh attack:
Proposition 22. If the tracer uses the interleaving defense, but the coalition uses the all-high attack, theñ
, and (34)
If the Dirichlet distribution is usedμC will scale as c 1−κ for large coalitions:
Proposition 23. Let f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with cutoff δ = 0. If the tracer uses the interleaving defense, but the colluders use the all-high attack, theñ
We now investigate the binary case q = 2. We can then rephrase Proposition 22 as Corollary 24. For q = 2, if the tracer uses the interleaving defense, but the coalition uses the all-1 attack, theñ µC = c E P P c−1 0
In the binary case, we obtain explicit results for the coin-flip attack against the interleaving defense:
Proposition 25. For q = 2, if the tracer uses the interleaving defense, but the coalition uses the random coin-flip attack, theñ µC = 
Note the similarity between the coin-flip attack and the all-1 attack. For the Dirichlet distribution, this can be analytically shown:
Proposition 26. Let q = 2 and f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with parameter κ = 
For large c these behave asμC ∝ c 1−κ andσ Table 1 : Numerical trends for the performance indicatorμC/σinn in the binary case q = 2 for large c.
Interleaving attack
Finally, we will analyze the interleaving attack.
Lemma 27. If the tracer uses a strongly centered score function and the coalition uses the interleaving attack, theñ
The performance of the all-high defense against the interleaving attack can be analyzed as Proposition 28. If the tracer uses the all-high defense but the coalition uses the interleaving attack, theñ
where T belongs to the all-high defense.
Proof. 
In the binary case this reduces to Proposition 29. For q = 2, if the tracer uses the all-1 defense, but the coalition uses the interleaving attack, theñ
Proof.
The scaling behaviour for large c is Lemma 30. Let q = 2 and f P be the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with parameter κ = .
For large c, this scales as c (κ+1)/2 .
The interleaving attack against coin-flip defense behaves as follows in the binary case:
Lemma 31. For q = 2, if the tracer uses the coin-flip defense, but the coalition uses the interleaving attack, theñ
NUMERICAL RESULTS
To verify our theory and its practical applicability, we ran simulations for the binary case and the arcsine distribution (without cut-off). We chose to simulate the five described attacks (interleaving, all-1, coin-flip, majority-vote, and minority-vote) and their optimal defenses. Both the cases where the defense matches the colluder strategy and the mismatches were simulated to obtain theμC and theσinn for 1 ≤ c ≤ 200. We then analyzed this data to obtain the leading-order term in c. The results can be found in Table  1 . The matching cases for each considered attack are shown in Figure 2 . The interleaving defense and attack values are depicted in Figures 3 and 4 . Since for mismatches the innocent score is no longer normalised (σinn = 1), we present the numeric results forμC/σinn to make a fair comparison.
Looking at the diagonal elements of the table above, only the interleaving attack keeps a constantμC. For the other four attacks analysed,μC seems to grow as c 1/4 . We were able to prove this only for the all-1 attack. The mismatches bring even more surprises. As expected, in some cases the defense fails completely against different attacks withμC/σinn tending to 0 (majority-vote attack against coin-flip defense) or even negative (interleaving and majority-vote attacks against the minority vote defense). Other cases tend to a constant µC/σinn and many cases even still grow as c 1/4 . Surprisingly, we often seeμC/σinn > 2/π, the value for the Tardos score function. There are two exceptions seen in the defenses: firstly, the minority vote defense is an exception to this, as it only seems to work well against the minority vote attack, and is of little or no use against other attacks. Secondly, the coin-flip defense also fails against the majority-vote attack, and seems to scale as approximately c −3/4 against the interleaving attack. We do stress that these five attacks are by no means exhaustive, so we do expect more exceptions to this observation.
Another intriguing pattern from the numerical data is the similarity of the all-1 and coin-flip attacks. Except against the all-1 defense, they have the exact same numerical results. Even though for the all-1 attack against the coin-flip defenseσinn = 1, the normalizedμC/σinn values are again the same. We have proven this against the interleaving defense in Proposition 26. This similarity can be explained by realizing that after the collusion attack is performed, the tracer can flip all symbols in the positions where the coalition produced a 0. This transforms the coin-flip attack into the all-1 attack, with the caveat that the coalition then never can receive the 0 vector. Naturally, this does apply to the all-1 defense, as this score function is not symbol-symmetric.
We do stress that in the case of mismatches,σinn = 1. This means that to use our optimal score functions in a practical Tardos traitor tracing system, we need to add an additional step to the accusation phase. After calculating the user scores, we will need to estimateσinn and normalize the scores before we can check them against the Tardos threshold. 
DISCUSSION
We have investigated the optimization of the performance indicatorμC/σinn for bias-based traitor tracing in the simpledecoder setting. A straightforward Lagrangian approach yields a simple expression (Theorem 1) for the optimal suspicion function in a wide variety of contexts, e.g. CDM and RDM, binary and q-ary. The result is a Neyman-Pearson score for the hypothesis j ∈ C based on single-position information. It also has the form of a Fisher score, though without a fully understood interpretation.
The h function we obtain with the Lagrangian method depends either on the collusion strategy or on the coalition's symbol tallies m. These quantities are usually unknown to the tracer. Our optimization approach does not allow for deriving suspicion functions that are based purely on data known to the tracer.
In Section 3.1 we speculated on the use of the m-dependent suspicion function in the EM algorithm or as a consistency check for candidate coalitions. Further exploration is left for future work.
For several binary and q-ary attacks in the RDM we have derived the optimal suspicion function. We have investigated the performance indicatorμC/σinn in many combinations of suspicion function and attack strategy. In some cases analytic results are obtained. Notably, the matching case of the q-ary interleaving attack givesμC/σinn =μC = √ q − 1, asymptotically (c → ∞) yielding a code rate precisely equal to the channel capacity [3] . For q = 2 the results are summarized in Table 1 . We observe that the interleaving defense, all-1 defense and majority voting defense outperform the Tardos suspicion function for all the considered attacks. In many cases even the power of c is changed from ∝ c 2 to c 3/2 , which is a huge reduction. It is dangerous to draw general conclusions from the table, however, since not all possible attacks are listed.
The results of Sections 4-6 give us hope that the strategydependent suspicion functions can be used advantageously in a practical tracing scheme. We envisage a decoder that runs the Tardos function and a small battery of our h functions in parallel (one for every known 'basic' strategy, e.g. the ones discussed in this paper). Whenever the colluders use one of the basic strategies, the associated h function will quickly distinguish them from the innocent users; for other strategies, the Tardos function still does the job. The challenge is to combine the different score systems into an effective decoder. Here it has to be borne in mind that both the computational load and the total false positive probability grow with the number of incorporated h functions.
Future work will focus on (a) more precise performance indicators such as false positive and false negative error probability; (b) attacks targeted against the special suspicion functions derived in this paper (c) simulations using multiple suspicion functions in parallel (d) iterative joint decoders employing the m-dependent suspicion functions.
